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DEVELOPMENTS
The Settlement Claims Case: Dames &
Moore v. Regan
The recent Supreme Court ruling in Dames & Moore v. Regan' could
turn out to be a landmark in international law." The Justices of the Su-
preme Court, in a unanimous decision fashioned a narrow ruling closely
tied to the extraordinary events in Iran. The Court agreed that the Presi-
dent had the power to nullify judicial attachments, to order the transfer
of Iranian assets out of the country, and to rule that private claims by
American companies be settled by an international arbitration tribunal
rather than by American courts. The Court determined that the Presi-
dent's actions were fully within the parameters of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA).3 The importance of
this decision lies not only in its legal significance but in the political con-
text in which it arose. The "Hostage Crisis" was the most sensitive issue
in the last Presidential election, yet few dared to criticize the President's
handling of it. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to make a political
quantum leap, but delicately avoided opening the Pandora's box and ad-
dressed only the legal issues presented to it.
On November 14, 1979, in response to the taking of American citi-
zens as hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, President Carter de-
clared a national emergency pursuant to the IEEPA and blocked the re-
moval or transfer of all Iranian property subject to the jurisdiction of the
-United States. 4 The Treasury Department then issued implementing reg-
ulations which invalidated any attachment of property obtained without
a license or authorization from the Secretary of the Treasury." Subse-
1. 49 U.S.L.W. 4969 (1981).
2. See Busiszss WEEK, July 20, 1981, at 62.
3.. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (Supp. I1 1979). Section 1702 (a)(1) provides in part:
At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title, the Presi-
dent may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instruc-
tions, licenses, or otherwise-
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers or credit or payments between, by, through, or to any
banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments in-
volve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof.
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or pro-
hibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, trans-
portation, importation or exportation of or dealing in, or exercising any right,
power or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; by any per-
son, or with respect to any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.
4. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R 457 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701
(notes)(Supp. 1981).
5. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.201, 535.203(a), 535.310, 535,502 (1980).
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quently, the Secretary granted a general license authorizing judicial pro-
ceedings, including prejudgment attachments against Iran, with the ex-
ception of the "entry of any judgment or of any decree or order of similar
or analagous effect. . .. "
On December 19, 1979, Dames & Moore, the petitioner, filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the
Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and
several Iranian banks, alleging that it was owed $3.7 billion for services
performed pursuant to a contract with AEOI.7 The district court issued
orders of attachment against the property of the defendants, and prop-
erty of certain bank defendants was then attached to secure any future
judgment which later could be entered against them. On January 20,
1981, the American hostages were released pursuant to an agreement en-
tered into the day before between the United States and Iran. This agree-
ment was embodied in two declarations of the Government of Algeria: the
Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and the
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.'
Under the terms of the Agreement, the United States is obligated to:
"terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims
of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enter-
prises, nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, prohibit
all further litigation based on such claims and bring about the termina-
tion of such claims through binding arbitration." The Agreement also
called for the establishment of an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 0
to arbitrate all claims not settled within six months of the date of the
Agreement. The proceedings before the Tribunal will be subject to the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 1 except where modified by the Claims Settle-
ment Agreement. Awards of the Claims Tribunal are to be "final and
binding" and "enforceable" in the courts of any nations. Additionally, the
Agreement required that all Iranian property then in the United States
6. 31 C.F.R, 535.504(a)-(b)(1) (1980).
7. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 49 U.S.L.W. 4969, 4971 (1981).
8. Iran-United States: Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, reported in 21 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 224 (1981).
9. 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 227 (1981).
10. The tribunal has jurisdiction under the terms of the Agreement to decide claims of
U.S. nationals against Iran that arise out of (1) debts, (2) contracts, (3) expropriations, or
(4) other measures affecting property rights. Claims which are barred include those that
arise out of events occurring before January 19, 1981, and concerning: (1) the seizure of the
hostages in Iran; (2) their subsequent detention; (3) injury to U.S. property or property of
U.S. nationals within the U.S. Embassy in Iran after November 3, 1979; and (4) injury to
U.S. nationals or their property "as a result of popular movements in the course of the
Islamic revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran." 49 U.S.L.W. at
2636. See also BUSINESS WEEK, May 4, 1981, at 58.
11. 46 Fed. Reg. 19,893 (1981).
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be transferred back to Iran. One billion dollars of these assets were trans-
ferred into a "security account" to be used for the payment of awards
made by the Claims Tribunal. Nearly eight billion dollars of the remain-
ing unfrozen assets were transferred to a bank account in England in the
name of the Banque Centrale D'Alg~rie pending the safe release of the
American hostages. A total of about $3.7 billion were transferred to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to pay outstanding syndicated bank
loans. Another $1.4 billion went into an escrow account to pay outstand-
ing loans as to which amounts may still be in dispute. The excess of the
assets in the escrow account was then transferred to Bank Markazi Iran."
On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief against the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury, seek-
ing to prevent enforcement of the Executive orders and Treasury Depart-
ment regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran in a way that
would adversely affect its actions against the Iranian defendants."3 Peti-
tioner alleged that these Executive orders and regulations were unconsti-
tutional to the extent that they affect its final judgment against the Gov-
ernment of Iran and AEOI. The district court denied petitioner's motion
for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court, however, en-
tered an injunction pending appeal preventing the federal government
from requiring the transfer of Iranian property that is subject to any writ
of attachment, garnishment, judgment, levy, or lien issued by any court in
favor of petitioner."' Upon granting certiorari before judgment, the Su-
preme Court of the United States held:
1. The President was authorized to nullify the attachments and order
the transfer of Iranian assets by the provision of the IEEPA 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(1)(B), which empowers the President to 'compel,' 'nullify,'
or 'prohibit' any 'transfer' with respect to, or transactions involving,
any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in which
any foreign country has any interest.
2. On the basis of the inferences to be drawn from the character of the
legislation, such as the IEEPA and the Hostage Act which Congress
has enacted in the area of the President's authority to deal with inter-
national crises, and from the history of congressional acquiescence in
executive claims settlement, the President was authorized to suspend
claims pursuant to the Executive Order in question here.
3. The possibility of the President's actions with respect to the sus-
pension of the claims may effect a taking of a petitioner's property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment in the absence of just compensa-
tion, makes ripe for adjudication the question whether petitioner will
have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims. And there is no jurisdic-
12. TIME, June 1, 1981, at 37.
13. Dames & Moore v. Regan, No. 81-2064 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (complaint).
14. Id. (order of May 28, 1981).
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tional obstacle to an appropriate action in that court under the Tuck-
er Act.15
The President's power in the area of foreign policy was challenged in
Goldwater v. Carter," where the Supreme Court was presented with the
constitutional issue regarding the proper procedure for treaty termina-
tion. In Goldwater, the President's actions terminating the Mutual De-
fense Treaty of 1954 with the Republic of China 7 without the advice or
consent of the Senate was challenged. Although the Court declined to
rule on the constitutional question presented to it and merely vacated the
prior judgment, the result was that the President was not precluded from
unilaterally terminating the Treaty. 6 While not expressly ruling on the
issue presented to it, the Supreme Court tipped the delicate balance of
power in favor of the Executive, when it found that it was politically ex-
pedient to do so. 19
It has been argued that the President has certain authority with re-
spect to the disposition of foreign assets pursuant to IEEPA, 0 but the
issue in dispute is the nature and extent of the powers the President pos-
sesses under that Act. In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court relied on
two recent appellate court cases which addressed the same issue. In Chas.
T. Main Int'l Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority,' the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit entered an order approving attachment of
Iranian assets on trustee process, and entered a temporary restraining or-
der preventing the Iranian defendants from "selling, assigning . . . or in
any way disposing of any of the assets located in the United States." The
court remarked: "The language of IEEPA is sweeping and unqualified. It
provides broadly that the President may void or nullify the 'exercising
[by any person] any right, power or privilege with respect to . . .any
property in which any foreign country has any interest ... ",2
In American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,23 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia similarly remarked:
The Presidential revocation of the license be issued permitting
prejudgment restraints upon Iranian assets is an action that falls
within the plain language of the IEEPA. In vacating the attachments,
he acted to nullify and void ... any exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to ... any property in which any foreign coun-
try ... has any interest ... by any person ... subject to the juris-
15. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4970. See also Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
16. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
17. Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-Republic of China, 6 U.S.T.
433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
18. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
19. See Note, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutional
Controversy Continues In Goldwater v. Carter, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 239 (1980).
20. See, e.g., WAsH. PosT, June 25, 1981, at A25, col. 1.
21. 651 F.2d 800 (1981).
22. Id. at 807.
23. No. 80-1779, 80-1891 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 1981).
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diction of the United States."'
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the en-
actment of the IEEPA in 1977 limited the President's emergency pow-
ers.2 5 The Court stated that the operative provisions of section 1702 of
the IEEPA "basically parallels" section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the
Enemy Act (TWEA) from which the language of the IEEPA is directly
drawn.2 6 Therefore, within certain limitations, the President has the same
blocking powers under IEEPA as under the TWEA.
2'
In drafting the IEEPA, Congress observed that the TWEA had be-
come "essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to ex-
ercise at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and interna-
tional economic arena, without Congressional review."'18 Congress thus
determined that such extreme wartime powers were inappropriate in
peacetime emergencies. The IEEPA's legislative sponsor noted that
TWEA created "a dangerous situation in that it virtually conferred upon
the President what could have been dictatorial powers.. .. ,,29 To limit
the scope of Executive Authority, IEEPA substituted a "new set of inter-
national economic powers, more restricted than those available during
time of war. . .. "1,0
The TWEA confers upon the President two main powers: 81 1) the
power to freeze or block the transfer of foreign-owned assets in the
United States;s2 and 2) the power summarily to seize and permanently
vest title to foreign-owned assets and use them "for the benefit of the
United States."8
The IEEPA specifically excluded those portions of section 5(b) of the
TWEA which authorized the President "1) . . . to vest title to foreign-
owned assets; 2) to regulate purely domestic transactions; 3). . . to regu-
late gold or bullion; and 4) . . . to seize records." The Supreme Court
addressed this distinction in a footnote:
24. Nos. 80-1779, 80-1891, slip op. at 18-19 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 1981).
25. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4974.
26. Id. See also Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (cur-
rent version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
27. Congress did impose certain limitations on the President's power under IEEPA that
were not imposed under section 5(b) of the TWEA. Under IEEPA, the President may not
"vest" foreign property, nor may he seize records or regulate solely domestic transactions.
See S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
28. H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as IEEPA
House Report].
29. HOUSE COMM. ON ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, REvISION OF TRADING WrrH THE
ENEMY AcT, Markup on H.R. Doc. No. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
30. IEEPA House Report, supra note 5, at 10.
31. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
32. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1976).
33. Id. at § 5(b)(1). See Bishop, Judicial Construction of the Trading With the Enemy
Act, 62 HAMv. L. REv. 721 (1949).
34. IEEPA House Report, supra note 28, at 15.
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Although it is true the IEEPA does not give the President the power
to 'vest' or to take title to the assets it does not follow that the Presi-
dent is not authorized under both the IEEPA and the TWEA to oth-
erwise permanently dispose of the assets in the manner done here. 8
The Court buttressed its position by restating a previously recog-
nized congressional intent that the purpose in authorizing blocking orders
is "to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President. ... ."'
A contrary view was taken by the United States District Court for
Northern Texas in Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Iran v. Social
Security Organization of the Government of Iran,8 7 where the district
court, in interpreting the IEEPA, stated that it:
expressly excludes certain authority granted to the President under
the Trading With the Enemy Act, including 'the power to vest, i.e. to
take title to foreign property.' Thus, it is clear that under the IEEPA
the President may 'freeze but not seize' assets in which a foreign na-
tion has an interest.8
The district court's interpretation was based on the assumption that
Congress passed the IEEPA in 1977 to replace the Presidential peacetime
emergency authority which previously existed under the TWEA. 89 One
must contrast this fundamental premise with the Supreme Court's deter-
mination that both Acts of Congress are to be construed simultaneously.
If both acts are to be interpreted simultaneously, one could arguably dis-
pute the result reached by the Supreme Court. If, however, as the legisla-
tive history indicates, the IEEPA was enacted to specifically replace the
TWEA, then the validity of the Court's holding requires closer scrutiny.
One should examine the actual authority to freeze foreign assets as pre-
served by the IEEPA, contrasted with the vesting power which IEEPA
abolished. There is authority holding that a freeze, however uncertain its
precise duration, results in a temporary and not a permanent disposition
of foreign property. 0 The President's "transfer" order seeks to dispose of
Iranian assets by permanently divesting American creditors of their stat-
utory rights. Once such a transfer occurs, the freeze order no longer re-
tains the character of a temporary measure, but rather becomes a perma-
nent vesting order.
Although the Supreme Court declined to conclude that the IEEPA' 1
35. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4974 n.5 (1981).
36. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 493 (1949), as quoted in Dames & Moore v. Regan,
49 U.S.L.W. at 4974 (1981).
37. 49 U.S.L.W. 2531 (N. Tex., Feb. 12, 1981).
38. 49 U.S.L.W. at 2532.
39. Id.
40. Neilson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 424 F.2d 833, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also
Markham v. Cabel, 326 U.S. 404, 411 (1945). See generally Littaver, The Unfreezing of
Foreign Funds, 45 COLUM. L.J. 132 (1945).
41. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (Supp. III 1979).
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or the Hostage Act42 granted the President specific authority to suspend
claims pending in American courts, it did conclude that Congress had ap-
proved the settlement of claims by executive agreement.'" The Court re-
lied primarily on the International Claims Settlement Act of 19494 which
created the International Claims Commission, now the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission. This Commission has authority to make final
and binding arbitration decisions with respect to claims by U.S. nationals
against settlement funds.' 5 The Court rejected the petitioner's argument
that by enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,' Con-
gress divested the President of authority to settle claims by placing politi-
cal commercial lawsuits in the hands of the courts. The petitioner further
asserted that by suspending its claims, the President had usurped the
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts in violation of Article III of the Constitu-
tion. The Court instead stated that by enacting Executive Order No.
12294 the President did not attempt to divest the federal courts of their
jurisdiction, but merely attempted to suspend claims, because "those
claims not within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal will 'revive' and
42. Hostage Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1868). The Hostage Act provides:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United
States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of
any foreign government it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to de-
mand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears
to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the Presi-
dent shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen and if the release so
demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such
means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to
obtain or effectuate the release: and all the facts and proceedings relative
thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to
Congress.
Id.
43. Since 1952, the President has entered into ten binding settlements with foreign na-
tions, to wit: Settlement of Claims, May 11, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China,
30 U.S.T. 1957, T.I.A.S. No. 9306; Claims: Marcona Mining Company, Oct. 21, 1976, United
States-Peru, 27 U.S.T. 4214, T.I.A.S. No. 8417; Claims of United States Nationals, Oct. 27,
1976, United States-Egypt, 27 U.S.T. 4214, T.I.A.S. No. 8446; Settlement of Certain Claims,
Feb. 19, 1974, United States-Peru, 25 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 7792; Hungarian People's
Republic Settlement of Claims, Mar. 6, 1973, United States-Hungary, 24 U.S.T. 522,
T.I.A.S. No. 7569; Claims: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 7, 1969, United
States-Japan, 20 U.S.T. 2654, T.I.A.S. No. 6724; Yugoslavia: Claims of United States Na-
tionals, Jan. 20, 1965, United States-Yugoslavia, 16 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 5750; Bulgaria
Claims, July 2, 1963, United States-Bulgaria, 14 U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No. 5387; Poland: Set-
tlement of Claims of United States Nationals, July 16, 1960, United States-Poland, 11
U.S.T. 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 4545; Rumania Settlement of Claims of United States Nationals
and Other Financial Matters, Mar. 30, 1960, United States-Rumania, 11 U.S.T. 317, T.I.A.S.
No. 4451. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4976.
44. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621 et. seq. (1955). The Act had two purposes: (1) to allocate to U.S.
nationals funds received in the course of an executive claims settlement with Yugoslavia,
and (2) to provide a procedure whereby funds resulting from future settlements could be
distributed.
45. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4978.
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. (1976).
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become judicially enforceable in the United States courts. '417
The Court used an historical argument48 in concluding that the Pres-
ident had the authority to settle American claims. Although the decision
did not acknowledge plenary power in the presidency to settle claims
against foreign nations, it did acknowledge a grant of authority to the
President in settling claims which are a "necessary incident" to the reso-
lution of a conflict between our country and a foreign nation.4 9 An impor-
tant consideration in the Court's decision was the fact that Congress ac-
quiesced to the President's actions by not taking measures against the
Agreement when it had the opportunity to do so.5" Further corroborating
the Court's decision was the fact that the President provided American
litigants with an alternative forum, the Claims Tribunal, in which to seek
relief.51
The President's actions have not deprived American nationals from
obtaining relief for claims against the Iranian Government, but rather
have facilitated certain lawsuits by the creation of a ready made, interna-
tionally recognized forum. Moreover, if claimants are not within the juris-
diction of the Claims Tribunal, the same forums as originally sought-the
U.S. courts-are still available.
The Court did not address the question of whether or not the sus-
pension of claims would constitute a taking of property in the absence of
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment, 2 stating that the
issue was not yet ripe for judicial review. The Court did leave open the
question whether companies that do not fare well in the arbitration pro-
ceedings will have an adequate remedy at law in the Court of Claims
under the Tucker Act.58
Much criticism has been spawned by what some believe to be the
subjugation of property rights to the liberal authority granted the Presi-
dent to conduct foreign policy.5 The fact that the Court's decision was
rooted in an express grant to the President of constitutional and statu-
tory authority will certainly be considered, but the belief that the Court's
47. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4977.
48. In United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), the Court upheld the validity of the
Litvinov Agreement whereby the Soviet Union assigned to the United States amounts owed
to it by U.S. nationals, which funds were then used to pay outstanding claims of American
nationals against Russia. The Court recognized that the "power to remove such obstacles to
full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals . . . certainly is a modest implied
power of the President who is the 'sole organ of the federal government in the field of inter-
national relations.'" Id. at 229.
49. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4977.




54. 67 A.B.A.J. 647 (1981). See also Den. Post, June 24, 1981, at 26, col. 3.
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decision was motivated by political expediency will certainly not be de-
nied. The full impact of the decision will rest upon the decisions of the
Claims Tribunal and resulting future litigation.
Sharon D. Liko
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc.:
Another Chapter in the Continuing Conflict
between FCN Treaties and Title VII
The Fifth Circuit, in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc.,' re-
cently held that the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion (FCN) between the United States and Japan' grants wholly owned
American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations "the limited right to dis-
criminate in favor of Japanese nationals" in filling managerial and techni-
cal positions.' By contrast, the Second Circuit in Avigliano v. Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc.4 held that the Japanese Treaty does not exempt
wholly owned American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations from laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment.5 Spiess is unique because it
thrusts the Second and Fifth Circuits into discord regarding the applica-
bility of domestic employment discrimination laws to wholly owned Japa-
nese subsidiaries incorporated in the United States. Unlike Avigliano,
Spiess holds that "Article VIII [of the Japanese Treaty] does exempt C.
Itoh-America from domestic employment to the extent of permitting dis-
crimination in favor of Japanese citizens in employment for executive and
technical positions."
1. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
2. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Japanese Treaty].
3. 643 F.2d at 355.
4. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
5. In Avigliano, female secretarial employees of Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., a wholly
owned subsidiary of a Japanese commercial firm, appealed from an order entered by the
district court dismissing their claim of discrimination on the basis of sex and national origin
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et
seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., and the Thirteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. 638 F.2d at 553. The Second Circuit held that the Treaty did not
exempt Japanese companies operating in the United States "whether or not they are incor-
porated in the United States, from American laws prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment." Id. at 554. The present note should be read in conjunction with that published in
volume 10, number 2 of this journal on the Avigliano case. Development, The Impact of
Title VII Protection on FCN Treaties: Conflict and Interpretation, 10 DEN J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 373 (1981).
6. 643 F.2d at 359.
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